Asked before, not filtered after
One PII taxonomy, one gate — every surface consults the policy before it acts. Jurisdiction detector packs switch on per tenant as data, not a deploy — enforcement never flips fleet-wide.
Isolation here is a boundary, not a filter. You get your own application and your own database, so another customer’s system is refused permission to reach yours — rather than being trusted to ask only for its own rows.
And it is checked by machines, not only by reviewers: the release pipeline fails automatically if code attempts a data query without correct customer scoping.
Most platforms separate customers with a tenant identifier filtered inside one large database. One bad query crosses the line.
Its own application and its own database. No shared production database holds two customers' data.
A different customer's system is refused permission to connect to yours. Not a filter — a boundary.
The release pipeline fails if a query runs without correct scoping. Verified continuously, not asserted once.
Role-based access, workspace separation, per-user credentials. Colleagues do not inherit your connections.
Deleting a workspace, unmasking personal data or running an erasure each need a fresh one-time code.
Admins may review for quality and safety, but personal data is masked by default. Unmasking is logged.
A certification attests that controls were designed and operating across a window. It cannot assert that a dedicated database exists for you, or that a release is blocked when scoping is missing.
Recognition, redaction, routing and rights — as product behaviour rather than policy.
Australian, US and EU identifiers plus emails, phones and cards — real validation, not pattern guesses.
Always-on log redaction. The audit trail records what kind of data was involved, never the data.
Sensitive content reaches only providers under contractual no-training terms — by default, Anthropic.
GDPR, CCPA and Australian Privacy Act tooling, with the legal clock tracked and erasure safe under hold.
Into your dedicated database. Only no-training providers may see sensitive content. Everything produced stays inside your instance. Nothing lands in a shared pool, and nothing trains a public model. Consumer AI tools are blocked unless an admin makes a deliberate, logged, reversible exception.
Regional cells, with a clean exit written in from the start.
Dedicated to you, operated on your behalf.
Your property. We make no claim over it and do not train models on it.
Australia and the United States are live. Your instance is provisioned into your region at onboarding.
Exportable. On offboarding the instance and its data are returned or destroyed.
Not a compliance page bolted on at the end.
Your systems of record remain authoritative. No migration is required.
By workspace, channel, client and organisation — and by contractual boundary.
Workflows prepare and recommend, then wait at gates a named person passes.
What ran, what it produced and who approved it — recorded as it happens.
Recommendations carry their sources, and name the evidence that is missing.
Each connection granted explicitly, and withdrawable.
Each of these is read off the running product — settings a reviewer can be shown, not statements a document makes.
One PII taxonomy, one gate — every surface consults the policy before it acts. Jurisdiction detector packs switch on per tenant as data, not a deploy — enforcement never flips fleet-wide.
A channel is granted individual tools — never a whole server. Nothing said inside a channel can widen what it may reach, so instructions arriving in a conversation cannot escalate it.
Every log, trace and error line is stripped of credentials and sensitive-tier identifiers — tax file numbers, government IDs, cards, bank identifiers — before it reaches any sink, independent of policy state.
Every admin change records itself — who, what, where, when. Oversight queries run with the asker’s permissions, nothing more, audited under their name.
Customer zero, read from the live admin surface. These are the mechanisms behind the claims above — ask to be shown them in a briefing.
We would rather lose a deal than overstate a control.
Controls built to the Trust Services Criteria, evidence being collected. Not an issued report, and we will not describe it as one.
On request as finalised, published in full before enterprise launch.
A provisioning step at onboarding. Live today is Australia.
Production tier. We will not imply they are switched on for a trial.
If a control is not in place we say so on this page, not in the follow-up call.
Because it is checked on every release. The build fails if code attempts a data query without correct customer scoping. Isolation asserted once at design time is a weaker guarantee than isolation verified continuously.
Sensitive content reaches only enterprise providers under contractual no-training terms — by default, Anthropic. Consumer AI tools are blocked unless an administrator makes a deliberate, logged and reversible exception.
Weigh it honestly. A SOC 2 report attests that controls were designed and operating over a window; it does not assert that a dedicated database exists per customer, or that a release is blocked when scoping is missing. We are in preparation, we will say so until it is issued, and we are happy to be assessed on what is in place today.
Australia is live. A US instance is stood up as a provisioning step at onboarding — a clean dedicated deployment in your region, not a shared existing footprint.